In principle, fi scal policy is the only instrument by which governments in most of the EU countries can accelerate economic activity somewhat or at least cushion the perverse effects of economic crisis. The success of fi scal stimulus, however, is highly dependent on several conditions that may or may not prevail in a given economy. Based on the past experiences of old member states, this study tries to explore those István Benczes*
Fiscal Stimulus and its Effects in the European Union
In the wake of the fi nancial and economic crisis Keynesian macroeconomic management has once again come into the spotlight. The following article takes a critical look at the practice of expansionary fi scal policy in the EU's old member states between 1980 and 2005 in order to answer the question whether fi scal stimulus can be a successful response to the current crisis in both the short and the long run.
conditions which can result in success (i.e. accelerated economic growth) in times of fi scal expansion. It also elaborates on the issue whether fi scal stimulus can be an adequate and successful response to the current fi nancial and economic crisis.
We shall fi rst present a concise review of theoretical and empirical literature on fi scal policy and its growth effects. A stylised facts analysis will then be applied in order to study the practice of fi scal expansions by old EU member states between 1980 and 2005, with a special emphasis on those conditions which proved to be more prone to success. Following the systematic analysis of the past, we shall then turn to the current fi nancial and economic crisis and raise the question whether EU countries have enough fi scal room for manoeuvre for the artifi cial stimulus of their economies.
Real and Alleged Effects of Expansionary Fiscal Policy
According to Keynesian macroeconomics, fi scal stimulus can substantially increase aggregate demand through the multiplier effect. Assuming sticky prices and underutilised capacities, a successful anti-cyclical fi scal policy can stimulate current economic activity or cushion severe decline. 1 The ultimate effect of government stimulus (i.e. the value of the fi scal multiplier), however, is a function of a multitude of factors. The crowding-out effect can dampen expansionary effects enormously. Private investment, for instance, can be kept back by the increased interest rate or the unfavourable movement in the rate of exchange in times of fi scal laxity. Also, a substitution effect may evolve in the production of goods and services: instead of domestic private agents, the government itself, or foreigners, 1 In standard Keynesian models, households make their consumption decisions according to their disposable income. The fi scal multiplier is different, therefore, in the case of increased public spending or reduced taxes. In principle, the latter induces a smaller multiplier effect than the former. will step into the market in order to deliver goods and services. Beyond interest rate sensitivity and price rigidity, the degree of exposure to world markets and the applied exchange-rate regime can also have a signifi cant effect on the effectiveness of fi scal stimulus. Closed economies with fi xed parities have a higher chance of having a larger multiplier effect. The central bank can also have an infl uence on the ultimate size of the fi scal multiplier. 2
The success of expansionary fi scal actions depends on initial conditions, too. In the case of a relatively high and accelerating public debt and defi cit, along with a high risk premium, the fi scal multiplier can be rather small. 3 Fiscal laxity may not deliver the expected growth effects in times of general (i.e. global) economic slowdown, either -this is especially the case with small and open economies. 4
Reviewing the literature on the fi scal multiplier, Hemming and his colleagues came to the conclusion that the size of the multiplier -in the short run at least -tends to be positive but small. 5 Studying the large EU countries, and assuming the accommodative reaction of the central bank, Roeger and Veld claimed that the fi scal multiplier was close to 1 in the short run, but declined to 0 in the longer term. 6 Perotti calculated a multiplier of +0.8 for Germany between 1974 and 2000, whereas this fi gure was slightly negative in the UK. 7 Van Aarle and colleagues found that EU countries 2 Assuming perfect capital mobility and a fi xed exchange-rate system, the central bank has no other option than to accommodate to fi scal expansion by reducing the interest rate, thereby dampening the revaluation pressure on the domestic currency. In a fl exible exchangerate system, however, the monetary authority has a certain degree of autonomy. In such a scenario, the central bank can effectively infl uence the size of the multiplier. Cf. R. A. M u n d e l l : International economics, New York 1968, Macmillan.
3 Cf. for instance R. B h a t t a c h a r y a : Private sector consumption behaviour and non-Keynesian effects of fi scal policy, in: IMF Working Paper, No. 112, August 1999; O. B l a n c h a r d : Comment, in: O. B l a n c h a r d , S. F i s c h e r (eds.): NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Cambridge MA 1990, MIT Press, pp. 111-116. In fact, the fi scal multiplier can turn into the negative beyond a critical value of the public debt (a phenomenon called non-Keynesian effects). Fiscal expansion induces households to save more, as the lax fi scal policy can trigger a crisis in the short run. Households accordingly adopt a Ricardian behaviour, instead of the general Keynesian one. in general had a relatively small and non-persistent multiplier-effect. 8 They also showed that variance in the data was substantial. The authors therefore underlined that a generalisation could overshadow the differences amongst member states. All studies agreed, however, that the USA had a signifi cantly larger fi scal multiplier than countries in the EU. 9
The success of discretionary fi scal intervention can also depend on the specifi c instrument that a government selects. Additional spending on public investment and so-called core functions, such as education and research and development, have a higher chance to promote economic growth than other fi scal items (see especially Lucas and Afonso et al.) 10 The latter also underlined that expansionary policies with a redistributive character can devaluate the potential rate of economic growth. Somewhat surprisingly, in a recent study, Freedman and his colleagues classifi ed budget transfers, too, as pro-growth items, on the condition that they are properly targeted. 11 Afonso and Furceri have come to the conclusion that government consumption (both size and volatility), social transfers (size and volatility), indirect taxes (size and volatility), subsidies (size) and government investment (volatility) have a robust and statistically signifi cant negative effect on economic growth. 12
Fiscal Expansions in the EU between 1980 and 2005
In our stylised facts approach, those episodes (years) of fi scal expansion will fi rst be identifi ed which have exceeded a set limit. 13 In order to identify politically motivated fi scal actions (independent of busi-8 B. v a n A a r l e , H. G a r r e s t s e n , N. ness cycles), the cyclically adjusted primary balance has been chosen for analysis. Concentrating only on large fi scal steps, fi ltering out the effects of business cycles and disregarding interest payments may together guarantee that only the discretionary parts of fi scal policy will come under scrutiny.
Defi nition no. 1: A fi scal year is called "expansionary" if the cyclically adjusted primary general government balance has deteriorated by at least 1.5 per cent of the GDP as compared to the previous year. 14 Second, the consequences of expansionary fi scal actions will be analysed in the set population; most importantly, the success of fi scal expansion will be defi ned and analysed accordingly.
Defi nition no. 2:
A fi scal expansion is called "successful" if the average growth rate of the real GDP in the year of the fi scal action plus the following two years -that is, in years t, t+1 and t+2 -exceeded the previous two years' (t-1 and t-2) growth performance.
Since the ultimate objective of this paper is to elaborate on the conditions of a successful fi scal expansion, as a third step the analysis will turn to the composition of fi scal laxity. According to the political economy literature on fi scal policy and its effects, the composition of discretionary fi scal measures may effectively deter- 14 The chosen critical value (1.5 per cent of the GDP) is generally considered in the relevant literature to be a signifi cant change; see especially A. A l e s i n a , R. P e r o t t i : Fiscal expansions and adjustment in OECD countries, in: Economic Policy, Vol. 10, No. 21, 1995, pp. 207-248. mine the fi nal outcome. 15 Our population will therefore be divided into three groups: expenditure-side expansions, revenue-side expansions and mixed stimulations.
Defi nitions no. 3: a) fi scal expansion is called "expenditure-side" if the change (increase, measured in the GDP) in total expenditures from year t-1 to year t exceeded the opposite change (decline, measured in the GDP) of total revenues from year t-1 to year t by at least 30 per cent. b) A fi scal expansion is called "revenue-side" if the change (decline, measured in the GDP) in total revenues from year t-1 to year t exceeded the opposite change (increase, measured in GDP) of total expenditures from year t-1 to year t by at least 30 per cent. c) A fi scal expansion is called "mixed" if the difference between the change in total expenditures from year t-1 to year t and the change in total revenues from year t-1 to year t was not more than 30 per cent of the larger change. 16 Besides the composition, the reaction of the monetary authority will also be taken into account in searching for relevant conditions for successful expansionary fi scal policies. The central bank can have an effect on short-term interest rates only (if at all). The focus will therefore be on how real interest rates in the year of expansion and the following year changed.
Defi nition no. 4: Monetary policy is called "accommodative" if the difference in short-term real interest rates between years t and t+1 had a negative value.
Discussion of Results
The total number of observations was 364 (26 years times 14 countries). Applying defi nition no. 1 made it possible to categorise 35 episodes as expansionary; that is, almost 10 per cent of the total observations showed a large deterioration of the cyclically adjusted primary balance of the general government. The average size of the (relatively large) expansions was 2.5 per cent of the GDP (standard deviation: 1 per cent). Amongst the 14 countries under scrutiny, Greece applied expansionary measures the most frequently: 15 Cf. A. A l e s i n a , S. A r d a g n a : Tales of fi scal adjustments. Why they can be expansionary? in: Economic Policy, Vol. 13, No. 27, 1998, pp. 489-545;  I. B e n c z e s : Trimming the sails. The comparative political economy of expansionary fi scal consolidations, New York, Budapest 2008, CEU Press; R. P e r o t t i , R. S t r a u c h , J. v o n H a g e n : Sustainability of public fi nances, Bonn 1998, ZEI. 16 The classifi cation of fi scal expansions has been implemented according to a different base, too. Instead of total expenditures and revenues, current expenditures and revenues were applied in the definition, but no signifi cant change evolved.
Table1 Expansionary Fiscal Episodes of EU14
S o u r c e : own compilation. Total number of episodes   Austria  1993  1   Belgium 1980 , 1981 , 2005 3 Denmark 1982 , 1994 2 Finland 1982 , 1987 , 2003 France -0 1990 , 2001 2 Greece 1981 , 1985 , 1988 , 1989 , 1995 , 2000 , 2003 , 2004 8 Ireland 1990 , 1999 , 2001 Italy 1981 1 1986 , 1989 , 2 Portugal 1985 , 1993 , 2005 Spain 1982 1 Sweden 1992 , 2002 2 UK 1983 , 1990 , 1992 , 2003 8 times between 1980 and 2005. The UK, second in rank, pursued lax policies only 4 times. Besides Greece (1988 and 1989) , only Belgium (1980 and 1981) conducted large-scale stimulations in two consecutive years; no other country decided to do so.
Year of fi scal expansion

Germany
Netherlands
The time distribution of expansionary measures was also uneven. The eighties experienced 15 lax episodes throughout Europe. The nineties, on the other hand, were spent by initiating large-scale fi scal consolidation in order to qualify for the euro-zone. Accordingly, only 10 episodes proved to be expansionary in the whole decade. None of these episodes occurred in the immediate years of the changeover to the euro, i.e. in 1996, 1997 or 1998. The new millennium again witnessed a recurrence of fi scal profl igacy. With a guaranteed membership in the euro-bloc, it was tempting to embark on large-scale fi scal expansions: 10 episodes were counted in just six years. 17
The growth difference following the expansive fi scal measures was practically zero (0.17 per cent) in the whole population, with a standard deviation of 2.33. Whereas the overall picture is rather disappointing, the division of the total sample into a group with positive and another with negative growth differences implies more hope. Based on defi nition no. 2, 18 episodes proved to be successful out of the total 35. Moreover, in 14 cases the recovery in growth rates achieved at least 1 percentage point of the GDP. On the other hand, more than half of the unsuccessful attempts (10 out of 17) provided an at least 1 per cent point decline. 17 In Europe, a "reform-fatigue" emerged amongst member states after the introduction of the euro (G. M. B r i o t t i : Fiscal adjustment between 1991 and 2002: stylised facts and policy implications, in: ECB Occasional Papers, No. 9, February 2004). While in the fi rst years it simply meant a postponement of further reforms of the general government, later on, as a consequence of the global economic slowdown in 2001, the Maastricht reference values were violated by many. Countries such as Italy and France, as well as Germany, the one-time forerunner of stabilisation culture, entered the forbidden defi cit zone.
The data also reveal that the size of expansion itself does not tell us anything about the growth consequences of fi scal laxity. The average size of successful and unsuccessful fi scal attempts was almost the same (cf. Table 2 ).
The division of the population into three groups, based on the composition of expansion, can reveal which policy had a higher rate of success, i.e. a positive fi scal multiplier. The population of 35 episodes is, however, not a sizeable group. Therefore, the partitioning may question the relevance of our fi ndings. Still, some basic tendencies can be disclosed even in this case. According to the fi ndings presented in Table 3 , each of the three types of fi scal expansion could bring about a successful economic stimulus. Expenditureside expansions had, however, a smaller chance of being successful than mixed or especially revenuebased ones.
The overall impression would be the same if the 35 episodes were divided into successful and unsuccessful ones. In the former group, total revenues declined by 0.8 per cent of the GDP on average (std. dev. 1.25), whereas total expenditures increased by 1.5 per cent (std. dev. 2.25). In the case of the failed attempts, revenues declined by 0.6 per cent only (std. dev. 1), and spending increased by 2 per cent (std. dev. 2). Unsuccessful expansions therefore witnessed a less robust revenue decline and a more ambitious expenditure stimulus. By and large, these data seem to support the hypothesis that extra public spending can have a lesser chance of success than reduced revenues.
Disaggregating total expenditure and revenue, however, makes this evidence more complex. Public investment was the most often stimulated fi scal instrument in the entire sample. Somewhat surprisingly, the average size of fi scal stimulus on investment was twice As far as the revenue side is concerned, a reduction in direct taxes (such as wealth or income taxes) turned out to have a much higher chance of success than indirect taxes. This claim could be more straightforwardly supported within the group of revenue-side and mixed expansions. As a corollary, if a government was ready to adopt expansionary measures which were partly at least on the revenue side and those tax reducing measures were linked to income and/or wealth, the growth difference following the stimulus proved to be positive. (Nevertheless, there is no reason to claim that direct taxes and economic growth correlated negatively in the whole population. In fact, the value of the correlation was zero.) According to Keynesian macroeconomics, a reaction of monetary policy is key to the ultimate effect of fi scal stimulus. The central bank can respond to fi scal laxity in two ways. It can either increase the nominal interest rate in order to keep the nominal output constant, thereby defending price stability. Or if price stability is not endangered by the proposed fi scal stimulus, it can react in an accommodative manner. In the latter case, the mix of fi scal and monetary policy can leave the overall interest rate unchanged and boost national income.
Monetary policy, however, did not seem to play a role in the success of fi scal stimuli in Europe between 1980 and 2005. The average short-term real interestrate difference (as defi ned by defi nition no. 4) remained relatively low, although it had a negative (expected) value on the whole sample (-0.68; std. dev. 2.46) . Nevertheless, there was no statistically signifi cant correla-tion between the change in real interest rates on the one hand and growth differences on the other hand. To put it differently: fi scal expansions did not become successful because of the accommodative reaction of central banks.
In sum, our stylised facts analysis of EU countries has provided only modest food for thought regarding the conditions for successful fi scal stimuli. Admittedly, revenue-side expansions are more likely to be successful than expenditure-side ones (especially if combined with a reduction in direct taxes), but the picture is not unambiguous. Increasing public spending may trigger positive growth effects, too. The ultimate effects of expansionary fi scal policy are surely infl uenced by other factors as well. However, those factors might be either beyond the authority of the governments (such as the international economic climate or the behaviour of individuals), or they can be time and place specifi c factors which do not allow for the drawing of general conclusions.
Fiscal Expansion in Times of Crises
The current affairs of the world economy are, however, largely different from those of earlier times in many respects. First, the current crisis is not a local or regional phenomenon but a global one. Second, the crisis has undermined several fundamental pillars of both the world economy and national economies, which are now claiming simultaneous remedies. Even our understanding of the classic results of macroeconomics is considered in a different light. The well-known tradeoff with regard to fi scal expansion between the shortterm benefi ts (more income for redistribution) and the long-term costs (increased indebtedness and/or interest rate etc.) has come under crucial reconsideration. The benefi ts should now be interpreted on a much wider base than ever before. Fiscal stimulus does not simply dampen the fall of aggregate demand but also, and more importantly, it should prevent solid and wealthy capacities from breaking (and melting) down entirely, thereby stabilising employment and economic output. 19 Nevertheless, it is worth underlining that any discretionary fi scal action should take into account the following two constraints. First, in an overheated economy, the benefi t of additional public expenditure can never be a boost to output, but only an increase in price level. Second, fi scal intervention should be restricted exclusively to bad times and should be exerted 19 Even the IMF has called for a fi scal stimulus in as many countries as possible to maximise the net benefi t of fi scal loosening (cf. C. F r e e dm a n , M. K u m h o f , D. L a x t o n , J. L e e , op. cit.). temporarily; fi scal policy must follow an anti-cyclical pattern. These two conditions manifest themselves quantitatively in the concept of the output gap and the cyclically adjusted general government balance.
In the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, fi scal recommendations are formulated for both the member states and the EU itself by the European Commission, based on the phase of the business cycle in which they fi nd themselves. Our sample of the EU14's fi scal expansions seems to validate the adopted practice of the Commission. The correlation between the output gap and the growth difference (following the fi scal stimulus) is strong and signifi cant. The results are displayed in Figure 1 . 20 A fi scal expansion is more likely to provide positive growth effects if the output gap is relatively small (possibly negative). To put it differently: the possibility of a successful fi scal stimulus is higher if fi scal policy is anti-cyclical, as opposed to a pro-cyclical policy, when actual output is already exceeding the potential one.
As far as the current trends are concerned, in most of the 27 member states of the EU, the output gap has turned positive (that is, the actual growth rate exceeded the potential one) by 2008. These economies have apparently been overheated in the fi rst year of the crisis. How could this be the case? One possible explanation could be that, in fact, the actual rate was 20 Data are available for the period 1990 to 2005 only; the number of episodes has therefore narrowed down to 20. The correlation is even more robust if the outlier Portugal (1993) , where data accuracy is not evident, is left out of the sample. R 2 exceeds 0.5 in this case. not relatively high in 2008, but the potential rate of growth was unexpectedly low. It seems reasonable to assume that deep structural problems evolved in the EU (well) before 2008, which in turn devaluated the trend-GDP, causing the output gap to turn positive in the year of the crisis. The situation is, however, even worse because fi scal discipline has been seriously undermined after the changeover to the euro. The cyclically adjusted general balance was negative in most of the countries in the last couple of years. In short, 2008 found the large majority of EU countries with both a positive output gap and a high defi cit (cf. Figure 2 ).
Since the net position of the cyclically adjusted balance of the general government was negative in most of the countries (in 20 member states), the relatively high level of the actual growth rate (as compared to the potential rate) was already maintained by a high level of extra public spending. Room for fi scal policy manoeuvre has evidently been restricted by now. 21 Both the Stability and Growth Pact and international fi nancial markets would push these EU countries towards robust fi scal consolidations under normal circumstances. This scenario is indicated by the north-west direction of the arrow in Figure 2 . In the current crisis situation, however, no such sce-21 Only Finland, Denmark, Sweden and to a lesser extent the Netherlands could provide a positive structural general balance amongst the old member states of the EU. These were also the countries which initiated wide-scale reforms in their general government.
Figure 2 Output Gap and Cyclically Adjusted General
Government Balance in the EU27, 2008
Figure 1 Output Gap and Growth Differentials in Times of Fiscal Expansion
N o t e : Correlation is -0.64 (statistically sigifi cant).
S o u r c e : own compilation.
N o t e : CAB: cyclically adjusted (general government) balance. The adjustment was based on potential GDP (excessive defi cit procedure). The gap between actual and potential gross domestic product was calculated at 2000 market prices.
S o u r c e : own compilation, based on the AMECO database online.
nario can be politically viable. Instead, countries are expected to embark on further fi scal expansion, with the hope of successfully dampening a further decline in economic activity. Fiscal laxity, however, will also end up in an even more substantial deterioration in the fi scal balance. The south-east direction of the arrow therefore displays an optimistic (i.e. successful) crisis management scenario. The relatively low level of potential GDPs on the one hand and the high level of structural defi cits on the other hand can make the success of the government intervention rather unlikely, however. In fact, according to the latest estimates of the European Commission, the output gap will become negative in most of the countries in 2009. 22 This change will occur not because of an increase in the potential rates but due to a dramatic decline in actual growth rates. In terms of Figure 2 , this would mean an unfortunate shift towards the south-west.
Conclusion
The major international fi nancial institutions are unanimously demanding active state intervention. However, the fi nal effect of fi scal stimulus may be ambiguous in those situations where countries suffer from structural defi ciencies. And most of the EU member states indeed do so. The analysis of the experience of European expansionary fi scal policies pointed out that success (that is, accelerated economic growth) came about in countries which preferred tax reduction rather than the increase of public spending. Furthermore, a negative output gap seemed to be an important condition for success.
Nevertheless, in the current economic situation, where private demand has declined substantially, countries may have no other option than to fuel aggregate demand by boosting public spending. Governments should concentrate on extra spending, 22 EC: European Economy, No. 6, 2008. however, in the sphere of so-called core functions (such as education or R&D) on the one hand and the recapitalisation of the banking sector on the other. By pursuing such an approach, additional public money can contribute to the increase of potential GDP in the long run, beyond the short-term demand effect. The EU, unfortunately, has reached the current crisis with a trend-GDP expanding only at a decelerated pace and a positive output gap in the majority of the countries. Sadly enough, this has happened mostly in those countries where fi scal discipline already melted away years ago. Neither the earlier experiences, nor the current prospects are therefore too encouraging. 23 Furthermore, it is worth underlining that in times of crisis Crisis management cannot culminate in a prisoner's • dilemma-type situation, where the gain of one party is the loss of the others. The EU needs to coordinate its actions amongst the member states and should refrain from adopting protective measures which would endanger political and economic integration.
Not all member states can adopt expansionary fi scal • measures. The degree of fi scal room for manoeuvre differs signifi cantly from one country to another in the EU.
Extra budgetary spending must only be temporary • and cannot threaten economic sustainability in the long run. The problem of an ageing population can be disregarded only for the relatively short period of crisis management; in the long term, however, attention should be directed again towards the consolidation of public fi nances.
